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in Political Science – A Dialogue
between Theory and Data
Thomas Gschwend and Frank Schimmelfennig
Quick-and-dirty number-crunching ‘quantoids’ face them. Carefully
describing and interpreting ‘smooshes’ face them (Hatch, 1985). No
matter where they stand on ontological and epistemological grounds
and how we stereotype the respective ‘other side’, all researchers face
similar challenges posed to core issues of research design. How you deal
with theses challenges defines the research design for your individual
projects. A research design is a plan that specifies how you plan to carry
out your research project and, particularly, how you expect to use your
evidence to answer your research question.1
What is a relevant research problem? How can I improve concepts
and measurements in my research? Which and how many variables
and cases should I select? How can I evaluate rival explanations and
which theoretical conclusions can I draw from my research? Which
evidence would lead me to reject and reformulate my initial theory?
These are central questions political science students inevitably face
when they embark on their own research projects in a Master’s or a
PhD program.
This book was written to help advanced students of political science
think about these issues and come up with solutions for their own
research. It has emerged out of a seminar course that we directed for
several semesters. As the course united researchers from both the
quantitative and qualitative ‘camps’, mutual misunderstandings and
heated debates were inevitable. Despite this, seminar discussions also
shaped a number of shared beliefs that provide the common ground
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for this volume:
1. The methodological pluralism in our discipline is a strength rather
than a weakness.
2. The basic problems of research design are the same for qualitative and
quantitative political science research.
3. The methodological debate in the discipline often remains at an
abstract level and does not give sufficient practical guidance for deal-
ing with basic research design problems.
4. The distinction between qualitative and quantitative research is often
inadequate. Some solutions to research design problems are common
to both types of research; others cross-cut the traditional qualitative-
quantitative divide.
5. At any rate, finding solutions to research design problems involves
substantial trade-offs along the way. Each solution has its strengths
and weaknesses.
Thus, the contributions to this volume do not start with general
methodological discussions, but each focuses instead on a specific prob-
lem of research design. They explicate the problem, discuss various solu-
tions, emphasize the typical trade-offs involved in choosing one or the
other solution, present practical guidelines and illustrate the use of these
guidelines in an example taken from their own research. In the remain-
der of the introduction, we will give an overview of the basic problems
and different types of research design that will be taken up in the indi-
vidual book chapters.
Core issues of research design
At a very general level, scientific research can be conceived of as a dia-
logue between theory and data. Researchers formulate a theory, analyze
data to test it, reformulate their theory in light of the empirical evi-
dence, and then move on to test the reformulated theory with new data.
Or, starting at the other end, researchers make observations, develop a
theory to explain them, use additional data to test their theory, and pos-
sibly reformulate it afterwards. Individual research projects do not nec-
essarily go through the entire cycle. Science is a collective enterprise.
Some research projects focus on testing existing hypotheses; others are
more concerned with explaining specific observations and generating
new hypotheses.
We claim, however, that all research projects that take part in this dia-
logue between theory and data face the same set of core research design
2 Research Design in Political Science
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issues. These are: defining the research question and problem; specifying
concepts and theory; operationalization and measurement; selecting
cases and observations; controlling for alternative explanations; and
drawing theoretical conclusions from the empirical analysis.2 In the fol-
lowing paragraphs, we will address these tasks one by one.3
Defining the research problem. First of all, the researcher is faced with the
question: ‘What should I do research on?’ The most general answer to
this question is: ‘Something relevant.’ But relevant to whom and in
which way? At this point, we can distinguish between theoretical or sci-
entific relevance on the one hand, and social relevance on the other (see
King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, p. 15). Research is relevant to the scien-
tific community if it advances the collective dialogue between theory
and data beyond the current state of the discipline – by formulating,
testing and improving theory, by generating and improving data, and
by describing and explaining observations. To do so, the researcher
needs to identify puzzles and problems in the discipline such as a theo-
retical controversy; imprecise, inconsistent, incomplete or otherwise
‘bad’ theory; untested theories and unexplained observations; unreli-
able, invalid or otherwise ‘bad’ measurement and data. Research is
socially relevant if it addresses social problems, improves citizens’ and
policymakers’ understanding of the problem and, possibly, offers solu-
tions. To do so, the researcher needs to clarify the social relevance of her
research and demonstrate how it can be used to understand and solve
social problems (Gerring and Yesnowitz, 2006). Yet the current state of
the discipline leaves considerable room for improvement, and political
problems abound. So researchers still have to decide (and justify) which
of the numerous problems and puzzles they choose to address.
Specifying concepts. Whether we formulate and test theories or describe
and explain observations, we inevitably use concepts such as ‘democ-
racy’, ‘party’, ‘conflict’, and ‘peace’. In order to make research relevant,
these concepts need to be theoretically and/or socially important. But
they also need to be (properly) specified. It must be clear what we mean
by a specific concept, that is what its defining attributes are, how attrib-
utes and concepts relate to each other, and which empirical phenomena
they include and exclude. What attributes define a ‘democracy’? Does
‘peace’ exclude ‘conflict’? How do ‘parties’ differ from other organiza-
tions? Clear and unambiguous concepts are not only required for for-
mulating testable theories in the first place. When engaging in a
theoretical controversy, the researcher needs to examine the concepts of
the competing theories – especially when the theories use the same
Introduction: A Dialogue between Theory and Data 3
GSCHWEND_Ch01.qxd  12/7/07  9:28 PM  Page 3
terms. Starting from the data, descriptive inference requires no less careful
concept specification – for instance, if you make statements like ‘The
majority of states are democracies’ or ‘The occurrence of war is decreasing’.
Specifying theory. Causal theories formulate cause-effect relationships
between concepts. Thus, researchers not only need to specify the concepts
themselves but also their relationship. Most basically, theories specify the
order of the causal relationship between the concepts: what is the cause,
what is the effect? Further specification may concern the form of the rela-
tionship (linear or non-linear) and the direction (positive or negative).
Theories also need to specify the relationship among various assumed
causes. Is it additive, as commonly assumed in linear regression models,
or multiplicative, as is the case for interaction effects? Alternatively, causes
can be characterized as necessary and/or sufficient conditions of the out-
come. For instance, democratic peace theory holds that ‘joint democracy’,
the fact that two countries are both democratic, is a sufficient (but not a
necessary) condition for durable peace between them.
Furthermore, theories should specify the causal mechanisms that link
cause and effect and theorize on the process through which the cause
produces the effect. For example, the democratic peace has been
explained by the transparency and inertia of political decision-making
in democracies, which prevents secret preparations to war, slows down
military escalation and gives democracies sufficient time to negotiate
and find peaceful solutions to their conflicts (Russett, 1993, pp. 38–40).
Advocates of causal mechanism analysis also generally demand that
social science theories must specify their ‘microfoundations’ (Coleman,
1990; Hedberg and Swedström, 1998). That is, they must show how
social structures and environments translate into individual desires and
beliefs (macro-micro), how the actor produces preferences and actions
on the basis of these desires and beliefs (micro-micro), and how the
actions of many individuals are transformed into a collective, social out-
come (micro-macro). The more fully a theory is specified, the more fully
it potentially explains observations and the better it can be tested.
Measuring concepts. By specifying concepts and theory, we arrive at
testable theoretical propositions. In order to conduct the empirical test,
however, the concepts need to be operationalized and measured.
Obviously, democracy – even if clearly specified as a concept – cannot be
observed directly. This is often also true for the defining attributes.
Alvarez and colleagues (1996), for instance, define democracy as a polit-
ical regime in which offices are filled by contested elections. They then
4 Research Design in Political Science
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go on to provide ‘operational rules’, which specify the offices that need
to be included (the chief executive and the legislature) and indicators of
‘contestation’ (above all that there has to be more than one party).
Furthermore, the operationalization would have to include indicators
for determining the ‘chief executive’, the ‘legislature’ and ‘parties’. Even
after such a fine-grained operationalization, researchers still have to
choose the instruments for measurement, for example expert assess-
ments or legal documents. At any rate, the measurement needs to be
both valid (the data needs to correspond to the specifications of the con-
cept) and reliable (repeated measurement of the same phenomenon
must produce the same values of the indicator).
Selecting cases. Problems of case selection and selection bias are core
issues in both quantitative and qualitative methods textbooks. To be
precise, we need to distinguish between units of analysis, cases, and
observations. The unit of analysis is the abstract entity that we study
(e.g., states, institutions, decisions) which is often given by the theory.
‘Case’ refers to the specific units of analysis that we choose to analyze. If
the unit is ‘state’, this could be a single-case study of Sweden or a com-
parative case study of Sweden and Norway. Finally, one case may be
equal to one observation if it consists in a single set of values of the inde-
pendent and dependent variables. A single case, however, can also yield
multiple observations. Research on the accession of Scandinavian coun-
tries to the European Union might be based on a single set of values for
independent variables such as GDP per capita, growth, and export
dependency for each Scandinavian state. Alternatively, we can make
multiple ‘data-set observations’ (Collier, Brady and Seawright, 2004b,
p. 252) for each case, for instance by observing the values of these eco-
nomic variables at different points in time. Or we can turn to a series of
‘causal-process observations’ in order to see how structural economic
conditions were transformed into decisions on EU accession (such as
lobbying by interest groups and election or referendum outcomes).
For theory testing, the question is how observations can be selected
so that the results of the analysis are unbiased and provide a valid
assessment of the theory. For the description and explanation of social
phenomena, the question arises as to whether the selected observations
represent the class of phenomena adequately. Is ‘9/11’ representative of
transnational terrorism? Does an analysis of ‘Blairism’ allow for general
conclusions on the tendency toward personalization and media spin in
current parliamentary democracies? Sometimes random selection is
possible (as in studies of electoral behavior) but even here the selection
Introduction: A Dialogue between Theory and Data 5
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procedure may privilege one group of respondents over another – for
instance, those people spending a lot of time at home and thus more
likely to respond to calls by the polling institute. Sometimes we know
the entire population of cases – such as democracies or post-communist
revolutions – but empirical analysis of more than a few cases would be
too demanding, and the random selection of those cases would most
likely lead to bias. Finally, we may not even know the universe of cases.
Generally, researchers are therefore confronted with either unintended
or intentional non-random selection which must be taken into account
in order to arrive at valid generalizations and theoretical conclusions.
Controlling for alternative explanations. In the dialogue between theory
and data, we specify a theory in order to test it on the basis of the
selected cases and measurements. Alternatively, we draw on or construct
a theory in order to explain a set of observations or a specific outcome.
Yet even if we find a strong relationship between the theorized causes
and the observed effects, how can we be sure that this relationship is not
spurious and that other causal factors would not explain the observa-
tions just as well if not better? For instance, the ‘democratic peace’
might be attributed to the hegemony of liberal great powers or to high
economic interdependence between democratic countries. In other
words, we have to address, and control for, alternative causal factors and
explanations in our research. But how many and which alternative
factors or variables should be included in the analysis, and how do we
decide on which of these rival theories or causes provide the best
explanation?
Drawing theoretical conclusions. Let us assume we have successfully
tested a well-specified theory with valid and reliable measurements on
an unbiased selection of cases and that we have been able to reject alter-
native explanations. In this case, the theory is corroborated and does
not need to be revised or rejected. Often, however, we will encounter
anomalies such as deviant cases or statistically insignificant relation-
ships. What if, for instance, we find a single instance of two democratic
countries waging war against each other? Could one deviant case simply
be ignored or would this mean the democratic peace theory is flawed
and should be dumped in the junkyard of falsified hypotheses? Could
the theory be saved by respecification or by limiting its scope? At any
rate, empirical research results do not speak for themselves. The conclu-
sions we draw from them need to be well considered so that knowledge
is improved rather than prematurely destroyed or falsely preserved. At
6 Research Design in Political Science
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first glance, these considerations do not seem to be part of the research
design, because they only come up after research has been concluded.
However, research should be designed from the start in a way that allows
us to draw the right conclusions for theory.
Table 1.1 sums up the main challenges posed by the various issues of
research design. We need to define a relevant research problem, clearly
specify our concepts and theory, provide for valid and reliable measure-
ment, select cases that allow for the formulation of valid inferences and
generalizing our results, control for alternative explanations to demon-
strate the validity and superiority of the proposed theory, and advance
scientific progress in drawing our theoretical conclusions from the find-
ings. How we get there or, more modestly, how we get closer to meeting
these challenges, will be the subject of the chapters in this volume.
Basic types of research design
In general, research designs can be individually tailored to the concrete
research problem at hand. However, the literature suggests that there are
a few basic types of research design that researchers can opt for and that
differ with regard to, for instance, the selection of variables and cases,
the choice of data and methods, and their implications for theory. In the
following, we will provide an overview of the different types that will be
taken up in the individual chapters. The one basic dichotomy is that of
factor-centric vesus outcome-centric research designs; the other one is
large-n versus small-n designs.
Factor-centric versus outcome-centric research design. George and Bennett
(1997) originally introduced the difference between factor-centric and
outcome-centric research to describe alternative inference processes in
case studies. There is no need, however, to restrict this terminology
Introduction: A Dialogue between Theory and Data 7
Table 1.1 Research design tasks and problems
Research design issue Challenge
Research problem Relevance
Concepts and theory Clear specification
Measurement Validity and reliability
Case selection Valid and general inferences
Control Valid and best explanation
Theoretical conclusions Scientific progress
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merely to case study research. In fact, we find it very helpful when
evaluating potential research designs more broadly.4 Research designs
can be distinguished by the type of causal inference a researcher is try-
ing to make in order to answer a research question. In planning to make
a causal inference a researcher might be either interested in providing
evidence for one or more particular causal mechanisms and effects or,
instead, wants to account for specific outcomes as completely as possi-
ble. For instance, you could be interested in the mechanisms of how
voters’ preferences for particular parties facilitate their decision in the
voting booth or, instead, try to predict their voting behavior.
We call a research-design factor-centric if one is primarily interested in
the explanatory power of causal factors. The goal is to estimate the
direction and size of a particular causal effect of one or a few independ-
ent variables, Xi (i  1, … , n), on a dependent variable, Y, and to assess
their robustness. Independent variables are either explanatory or test
variables, which are of key interest for the causal effects and mecha-
nisms you are after, or mere control variables, which are included to
make sure that the causal effects can really be attributed to the explana-
tory or test variable rather than to alternative causal factors. Typical
research questions of factor-centric research designs are: Does Xi cause Y
or what effect does a Xi have on Y and how much? Thus if you are inter-
ested in how partisan preferences anchor a voter’s decision-formation
process, you might want to allow for alternative ways in which vote-
choice decisions can be rooted – such as ideological or candidate prefer-
ences – in order to disentangle their potential impact from that of your
major explanatory variable of interest.
A research design is outcome-centric, however, if one is primarily inter-
ested in explaining outcomes. The goal is to comprehensively assess
potential and alternative explanations by considering many independ-
ent variables, Xi, that in toto try to account for variance in the depend-
ent variable, Y, as completely as possible. Examples are explanations of
the varying success of UN peacekeeping operations or the differential
impact of EU law on the member states. Outcome-centric research might
also be interested in explaining specific single events (the Iranian revolu-
tion or the end of the Cold War – in other words, a dependent variable
without variance). The typical research question of outcome-centric
research designs is: What causes Y or why Y? Thus if you are interested in
predicting individual voting behavior you might want to choose an out-
come-centric research design and consequently include additional inde-
pendent variables (e.g., contextual or media effects) that help you better
predict behavior in the voting booth, even though the omission of those
8 Research Design in Political Science
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variables does not have the potentional to distort the individual-level
relationships that factor-centric researchers might focus on.
What reasons might there be to choose one design rather than the
other? We suggest that the choice is mainly up to the researcher’s inter-
est and considerations of relevance. If you are mainly interested in
explaining important events in politics (such as wars or revolutions) or
predicting the outcomes of specific political decisions (such as the for-
mation of a government coalition), the obvious choice is an outcome-
centric design. This often requires an in-depth knowledge of phenomena
in which you are interested.
If, however, your research is driven by a theoretical interest in causal
factors (such as resources or institutions) or mechanisms (such as polit-
ical socialization or political dilemmas), factor-centric designs are the
most suitable. Researchers opting for a factor-centric research design
have to ‘control for’, ‘account for’ or ‘hold constant’ the influence of
all potential confounding factors in order to separate out those effects
from the causal relationship in which they are primarily interested.
This is the central aspect for making valid inferences based on factor-
centric research designs. There are various strategies that facilitate
researchers in disentangling the causal net. Including control variables
in regression equations, matching methods or laboratory and field
experiments are potential solutions that require many observations.
Yet there also exist strategies that allow for distinguishing the hypoth-
esized from confounding effects without leveraging many observa-
tions. One strategy is to systematically compare only a few carefully
matched cases. Another strategy is the quasi-experiment, where one
compares the very same case before and after the ‘treatment’ such as
an institutional change or a policy intervention (George and Bennett,
2005, ch. 8).
The choice between factor-centric and outcome-centric research
designs is not necessarily tied to the state of theory development in a
given field, although in theoretically less advanced fields researchers
often opt for an outcome-centric research design. Such researchers try to
explore new phenomena by focusing directly on the variance of the
dependent variable. Nevertheless, good arguments have been made that
focusing on a comprehensive explanation of a phenomenon by maxi-
mizing the accounted variance of a dependent variable may not be the
most promising first step to develop new theoretical and empirical
insights (e.g., Geddes, 2003, ch. 2, King, Keohane and Verba, 1994,
p. 169, note 8). Such a strategy may simply not be feasible due to data
collection problems, may make estimates of all causal effects more
Introduction: A Dialogue between Theory and Data 9
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uncertain, or may be a hindrance to the accumulation of knowledge
based on a common theoretical framework.
Alternatively, following a factor-centric research design strategy, one
could break up a comprehensive explanation into more manageable
building blocks of a theory, identify relevant variables to describe the
causal mechanisms involved in these blocks, and afterwards, piece those
building blocks together. There is, however, considerable skepticism as
to whether such a ‘lego’ strategy (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p. 717)
actually facilitates the accumulation of knowledge. Critics of this
approach point out that, rather than answering big relevant questions in
broad contexts, this strategy leads to robust answers of small and poten-
tially trivial questions (Pierson and Skocpol,2002, pp. 713–18).
While theory development of a given field might predispose
researchers to employ a particular research design, it in no way deter-
mines the choice between factor-centric or outcome-centric research
designs. Even in theoretically more advanced fields, researchers do not
only opt for a factor-centric research design, although it might be easier
to isolate a particular causal factor and focus on the direction and size of
its effect, given the advanced state of theory development. For instance,
researchers may be primarily interested in forecasting future outcomes
such as elections or state failures. Then, of course, outcome-centric
research designs are essentially required to answer this kind of research
question.
Large-n versus small-n research design. What’s your ‘n’? One of the most
often applied dichotomies to classify research designs refers to the num-
ber of cases and observations you study. Large-n and small-n research
designs differ in the way in which they leverage available empirical
information. Large-n studies are commonly associated with statistical
tests of correlation-based inferences following a probabilistic model of
causation and leveraging ‘data-set observations’, that is, ‘observations
[that] are collected as an array of scores on specific variables for a desig-
nated sample of cases …’ (Brady, Collier and Seawright, 2004, p. 12).
Small-n studies, however, are commonly associated with either
within-case analysis or cross-case comparisons (George and Bennett,
2005) and with leveraging multiple ‘causal-process observations’ for a
single case (Brady, Collier and Seawright, 2004, p. 252). Case studies rely
on process-tracing in order to better understand the causal mechanisms
of the relationships and phenomena of interest (e.g., see George and
Bennett, 2005, pp. 147–9). Such inferences can be made by closely trac-
ing hypothesized causal processes either within a particular case or by a
10 Research Design in Political Science
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systematic (controlled) comparison across a small number of cases (such
as George and Bennett, 2005, ch. 8).
In other words, large-n studies seek to achieve and increase the valid-
ity of causal inferences by increasing the number of cases and data-set
observations, whereas small-n studies seek to attain the same goal by
carefully matching a limited number of cases and increasing the number
of causal-process observations. Small-n research prefers depth to
breadth, whereas large-n research prioritizes breadth. As a result, small-n
research potentially leads to very precise causal stories for one or a few
cases at the expense of generality, whereas large-n research strengthens
our belief in the generality and average strength of causal effects at the
expense of rendering individual cases largely ‘invisible’ (Ragin, 2000,
p. 31) and by being unable to explain any single case precisely.
How should one choose between a small-n and a large-n research
design? A fundamental principle is that better data collection methods
are preferable to better data analytical methods. Thus, it is the art-part of
designing your research in cleverly using available information, or gath-
ering new information, and thinking hard about alternative sources of
information and how they can be leveraged. Whenever sufficiently
quantifiable and comparable information is available, large-n research
designs are typically used. But buyer beware! Increasing the number of
observations, even if potentially available, is no free lunch. Is the new
information really comparable to the original? Do I have to stretch con-
cepts in order to derive comparability? Do the indicators fit the new
cases? The leverage obtained by adding observations might be reduced.
Alternatively, no harm is done in adding causal process information to
bolster causal claims based on the original data set. In fact, this percep-
tion is also shared by hard-core large-n statistical wizards (for instance,
see Beck, 2006; Goldthorpe, 2001).
The division of published research into small-n and large-n is not only
conceptual but shows up in actual research practice as well (see Bollen
et al., 1993, p. 327; Ragin, 2000, p. 25). Apparently there is a divide
between small-n and large-n research designs, but what is small and
what is large in that regard? On the lower end there are many single-case
studies or studies with a handful of cases, while on the upper end there
are also many studies that employ 50 and more, and in case of survey
data, thousands of observations. Given that we all have finite time hori-
zons and eventually need to produce some research output, researchers
typically focus on the depth of their case knowledge when employing a
small-n research design while they focus on the breadth of their findings
when employing a large-n research design. Studies between those two
Introduction: A Dialogue between Theory and Data 11
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poles have 10 to 50 observations. For such a study, it becomes less clear
whether it should leverage on in-depth knowledge or on its breadth. On
the one hand, there are quantitative electoral forecasting models con-
taining less than 15 observations which nevertheless employ the
method of statistical control common in large-n research designs (e.g.,
Bartels and Zaller 2001; Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1992; Norpoth and
Gschwend, 2003). On the other hand, qualitative comparative methods
such as QCA or fuzzy-set analysis (Ragin, 1987; Ragin, 2000) can accom-
modate dozens of observations.
At the end of the day, we are interested in why stuff happens in order
to provide explanations and improve our understanding of cause-effect
relations in the social world. There is, however, a considerable contro-
versy in the literature about how to conceptualize causality. Small-n
research tends to be framed as the analysis of necessary and sufficient
causal conditions. This entails at least implicitly a rather deterministic
(and nonlinear) view of causality. Large-n (but also some small-n)
research, however, has it the opposite way around and adopts a proba-
bilistic view of causality, according to which ‘…“causes” are factors that
raise the (prior) probabilities of an event occurring …’ (Gerring, 2001,
p. 129). In general, deterministic causes are helpful if we can assume
that the relationship between independent variables and our dependent
variable is in fact deterministic. They can give us clear guidelines as to
what we should be seeing empirically, if they were really true, and help
us disentangle the causal net. But when can we really be sure about
deterministic causes in political science? On the one hand, nature might
be random to some extent. Thus, even if we were able to measure our
concepts precisely, we would never be able to completely explain varia-
tion in our dependent variables. This is still true even if we were to
include all the variables we can ever dream of and specify the potentially
non-linear model correctly. In other words, we not only assume that we
included, but also modeled, all contingent causal factors correctly. On
the other hand there is also the problem that all measures are imperfect.
Thus the very act of measuring a theoretical concept, even if we tend to
believe in a deterministic causal world, does always introduce some ran-
domness in the analysis.
This controversy is not only relevant from a philosophy of science
perspective. It also has important implications for your research design
and the interpretation of your results. Think about it this way: How do
we deal with a single case or observation that deviates considerably
from an otherwise nice causal pattern? If you believe in a deterministic
causal world with perfect measures and correctly specified models of
12 Research Design in Political Science
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relationships, you will have a serious problem. The single deviant case
is evidence against your theory and must lead to its reconsideration. For
believers in probabilistic causes, be they small-n as well as large-n
researchers, a deviant case is simply an outlier. However, even if you
believe in deterministic causes and perfectly specified theoretical expla-
nations, outlying observations can happen and do not by themselves
invalidate your hypothesis simply due to less-than-perfect conceptual-
izations of your theoretical building blocks and measurement error.
There are several ways to deal with outlying observations independent
from the number of observations available. One strategy is to argue that
the model is correctly specified and observations deviate from the gen-
eral pattern because of noisy measures. Another way is to account for
outlying observations directly by rethinking your theory. Following this
strategy, the deviations from an expected general pattern are of substan-
tive interest rather than produced by our inability to measure precisely.
When rethinking your theory, one conceivable strategy would be to try
specifying ‘scope conditions’ (Ragin, 2000, pp. 61–2; Walker and Cohen,
1985) and make explicit under what circumstances we expect certain
relationships to hold. Maybe the theorized causal structure does really
only hold for a sub-sample of all available observations – given the unit
homogeneity assumption (Achen, 2002, pp. 446–7). Another strategy
would be to keep all observations but reformulate the expected univer-
sal causal relationships by considering interaction effects or non-linear
transformations among independent variables. This would allow you to
stipulate conditional or non-linear effects of several explanatory or test
variables on your dependent variable. In addition, including new inde-
pendent variables might prove helpful to better account for outlying
observations. Probably due to the economy of scale – that is, a single
outlier does seem to matter more for a proposed explanation if the num-
ber of observations is five rather than 5000 – small-n researchers are
likely to jump at deviant cases while large-n researchers look rather for a
quick statistical fix if they care at all about a few outlying observations
(e.g., Western, 1995).
Nevertheless, many important theories are framed in terms of neces-
sary and sufficient conditions (see, for example, Dion, 1998; Goertz and
Starr, 2003; Seawright, 2002). In trying to bridge the gap between deter-
ministic and probabilistic causal worlds, new methodological
approaches develop tests and estimate models of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions, partly within a Bayesian framework in order to avoid
falling into a small-n trap (Braumoeller, 2003; Braumoeller and Goertz,
2000; Clark, Gilligan and Golder, 2006; Seawright, 2002). Thus the
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choice between small-n and large-n research designs is partially inde-
pendent of whether statistical tests are used, whether correlation- or
process-based inferences with data-set or causal-process observations are
employed, and of whether one believes in probabilistic or deterministic
models of causation.
We thus arrive at a two-dimensional conceptualization of research
designs represented by the cells on the main diagonal in Table 1.2 that
goes beyond the widely used dichotomy of qualitative and quantitative
research. Factor-centric research designs employ the method of statisti-
cal control or (field) experiments to disentangle a key causal factor in
the causal net if many observations can be leveraged for inferential pur-
poses. Outcome-centric small-n researchers provide an in-depth, within-
case study of potential factors and causal processes that explain the
occurrence of single events as comprehensively as possible. The off-
diagonal cells are not empty, however. On the one hand, focused cross-
case comparisons or quasi-experiments can be used in factor-centric
research designs if only a few observations are available. On the other
hand, there are large-n outcome-centric research designs, which have
the potential to describe a phenomenon and forecast future occurrences
of this phenomenon using statistical as well as qualitative comparative
methods.
An overview of the chapters
In the previous sections we gave an overview of the core problems and
different types of research design. In order to get to know our tool-box
for developing a well-designed research project, we need to know to
what extent the core problems of research design are the same for all of
them. The literature is spread along two extremes here. On the one
hand, some argue that qualitative research should merely follow a quan-
titative template of how to do good research as closely as possible and
14 Research Design in Political Science
Table 1.2 Typology of research designs
Type of causal inference
Factor-centric Outcome-centric
Number of Large n Statistical control, Forecasting, qualitative
observations (field) experiments comparative analysis
Small n Cross-case comparisons, Case studies
quasi-experiments 
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everything will be all right (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). This is
‘quantitative imperialism’. At the other extreme, there are scholars who
portray qualitative and quantitative research as having entirely different
logics (see, for instance, McKeown, 1999; Thomas, 2005). Consequently,
qualitative and quantitative research designs – be they factor-centric or
outcome-centric, small-n or large-n – cannot talk to or learn from one
another. This is ‘qualitative separatism’. (One could imagine qualitative
imperialism as well as quantitative separatism, but these positions are
rather rare in contemporary political science.)
In this book, we start from the assumption that research generally
consists of a dialogue between theory and data and that all types of
research at least face the same problems and challenges. Whether they
also lend themselves to the same solutions, however, is an open ques-
tion that will be taken up in the individual chapters, each of which
focuses on one research design issue. The chapters follow a common
template. They first start with a specific problem of research design in
political science. Second, they explicate the problem, discuss various
solutions, and emphasize the typical trade-offs involved in choosing
one or another solution. Third, each chapter presents practical guide-
lines on how to deal with this particular research design issue in actual
research. Fourth, they illustrate the use of these guidelines in an exam-
ple taken from the authors’ own research.
In Chapter 2 on ‘increasing the relevance of research questions’,
Matthias Lehnert, Bernhard Miller, and Arndt Wonka define and distin-
guish theoretical and social relevance. The chapter then focuses on the
widely neglected social relevance of research designs. Lehnert, Miller
and Wonka deny that there is an inherent trade-off between theoretical
and social relevance and show how researchers can generally improve
the relevance of their research projects by responding to three questions.
Who is affected by what? How can the results be evaluated? Which
advice can be offered?
Do you really know what you are talking about? This is Arndt Wonka’s
central question in Chapter 3 on concept specification as a central issue
for research design in political science. Although it is not uncommon in
the literature that different defining attributes are used to refer to the
same concept, Wonka maintains that ambiguous concepts are not help-
ful in generating research which is expected to yield relevant results.
After formulating some hands-on advice on how to avoid conceptual
ambiguity, Wonka puts these suggestions to work and applies them to
the concept of ‘supranationality’ as is used in his and other scholars’
research on the European Union.
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In Chapter 4 on ‘typologies in social inquiry’, Mathias Lehnert deals
with a special case of concept specification. He critically evaluates
whether and how typologies can be used for either description or expla-
nation of social phenomena. He thereby develops three criteria by
which different ‘types of typologies’ can be distinguished in order to
confine the use of typologies to particular purposes. Typologies provide
simplified accounts of complex phenomena and can help establish unit
homogeneity in both factor-centric and outcome-centric research
designs. In addition to providing advice on when and how to use
typologies in political science, Lehnert illustrates how typologies can be
used fruitfully by referring to his own and other scholars’ work on polit-
ical institutions and their effects on political outcomes.
Measurement, Bernhard Miller’s topic in Chapter 5, is the next logical
step following concept specification. Miller highlights both the chal-
lenges when devising measures, couched in issues of reliability and
validity, as well as the tools that can be employed to address those chal-
lenges; here, he focuses particularly on the efficient use of indices as
composite measures. He emphasizes the universal role of theory and
concepts in any measurement process for any research design. Besides
explicitly considering typical trade-offs one faces in everyday research
practice, Miller also provides clear advice on how to devise new meas-
ures and illustrates them using his research on coalition committees.
In Chapter 6 Julia Rathke deals with the problem of comparability and
equivalence of measurements when relying on secondary data sources.
She argues that increasing the number of observations is no free lunch
but requires at least conceptually equivalent measures. Rathke distin-
guishes between two different strategies in the measurement process to
make sure that we arrive at conceptually equivalent measures: increas-
ing the level of abstraction and establishing functional equivalence.
After providing some practical advice on how to make data and indica-
tors comparable, Rathke draws on her research on the effects of social
capital on political orientations in Germany to demonstrate the practi-
cability of her advice.
Two chapters deal with selection and selection bias – one in quantita-
tive research, the other in qualitative research. In her discussion of selec-
tion bias in large-n research, Janina Thiem in Chapter 7 deals with
challenges that quantitative research often encounters: the universe of
cases – that is, the population of interest – is quite large and theoretically
well-defined but only partly observable. If those unobservable observa-
tions of the realized sample are not randomly distributed, every infer-
ence drawn from this sample will be biased. While well-known statistical
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fixes – which may or may not be helpful for a given research problem –
exist for such situations, Thiem argues that successfully dealing with
selection bias is foremost a theoretical problem. She then provides prac-
tical guidelines on how to identify and deal with potential selection
biases theoretically as well as statistically and finally applies these guide-
lines to potential selection effects in the analyses of roll call votes in the
European Parliament.
In his discussion of case selection and selection bias in small-n
research, Dirk Leuffen in Chapter 8 focuses on a situation that qualitative
research often encounters: the universe of cases is quite large but not
well-known or not well-defined. After reviewing Mill’s classical methods
of agreement and difference and the equally well-known most-similar
systems or most-dissimilar systems designs, Leuffen presents theory-
guided typologies as a strategy for case selection. He specifically argues
that leverage can be increased by narrowing down the domain, focusing
on a small set of theoretically interesting cells of the typology, and con-
centrating on ‘hard cases’. He illustrates this strategy with an example
from his research on French divided government.
Chapter 9 by Ulrich Sieberer focuses on the research design issue of con-
trol and discusses some basic theoretical and methodological choices
when selecting independent variables and the trade-offs that come with
them. He argues that the status of independent variables to control for
the influence of alternative factors differs greatly depending on whether
factor-centric or outcome-centric research designs are employed, while
it makes no difference whether you employ small-n or large-n designs.
Sieberer derives a number of practical guidelines and illustrates them
using his own work on explaining party unity in legislative voting
behavior.
Andreas Dür tackles the challenge of discriminating between rival
explanations in outcome-centric qualitative research. In Chapter 10 Dür
distinguishes three problems – omitted variable bias, explanatory
overdeterminacy, and indeterminacy – and suggests various strategies to
meet this challenge successfully: uncovering logical inconsistencies in
alternative explanations, increasing the number of observable implica-
tions of one’s own and rival theories, examining causal mechanisms
through process tracing, and selecting additional ‘most likely’ or ‘least
likely’ cases. After discussing their strengths and weaknesses, he illus-
trates the use of these strategies in his own research area: the analysis of
trade liberalization.
Dirk De Bièvre in Chapter 11 is concerned with the final phase of the
research process: what to do with a theory after it has been tested
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empirically and found wanting? He puts forward a theoretical under-
standing of falsification – entailing the replacement of faulty hypothe-
ses with new, presumably better ones – and presents guidelines for
formulating hypotheses and conducting research so that researchers
can make the most of theoretical falsification. De Bièvre draws on a
current research project on the effects of judicialization in the WTO to
illustrate the use of these guidelines.
Finally, in the concluding chapter we are concerned with the lessons
that can be learned for improving the dialogue between theory and
data. While all types of research face the same challenges there is no
cookie-cutter approach to help us dealing with them. Instead different
research designs offer and require different solutions, each of which pro-
duces specific trade-offs. How you evaluate these trade-offs should deter-
mine how you carry out your research project and, consequently, the
type of research design you choose.
Notes
1. For similar definitions, see Brady, Collier and Seawright (2004, p. 302); de Vaus
(2001, p. 9); or King, Keohane and Verba (1994, p. 118).
2. For a similar list drawn from King, Keohane and Verba (1994), see Collier,
Mahoney and Seawright (2004, pp. 36–7).
3. In reality, however, designing research is rarely so neatly ordered. It does not
always start at the beginning of the process or finish at its end, and it involves
a lot of going back and forth between the design problems.
4. For similar distinctions see Ganghof (2005a); Gerring (2001, p. 137); Scharpf
(1997, pp. 24–7).
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